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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE INCORRECT STANDARD TO
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, AND IN SO DOING, ERRONEOUSLY
DETERMINED THAT THATCHER WAS REQUIRED TO GIVE LANG
STRICT NOTICE BEFORE RETAINING HIS PRINCIPAL PAYMENTS.
Thatcher’s opening brief argued that the trial court failed to apply the correct

standard as it related to liquidated damages. (Cross-Aplt. Br., pp. 40-41.) Thatcher
asserted that the trial court appeared to have applied a heightened level of judicial
scrutiny to the liquidated damages provision at issue in contravention of Utah law. (Id.,
p. 40.) Liquidated damages provisions are to be reviewed like any other contractual
provision.

(Id.)

Such provisions are unenforceable only to the extent the party

challenging the provision shows it is unconscionable. (Id., p. 41.) Despite the foregoing,
the trial court improperly placed the burden on Thatcher to prove strict compliance with
her alleged notice obligations under the Agreement, concluding that even a “technical”
violation precluded enforcement of the provision. (Id.)
Thatcher contended that the trial court failed to address the separate liquidated
damages provision in the Option Agreement. (Cross-Aplt. Br., p. 46.) That provision, by
its terms, contains no notice requirement. (Id., pp. 43 and 46.) Thatcher explained that
the liquidated damages clause in § 4.4 of the Agreement also contains no notice
provision. (Id.) The liquidated damages provisions in these two agreements are not
inconsistent. (Id., p. 44.) Under the language of either agreement, Lang automatically
forfeited his prior payments if he failed to make a scheduled payment within 30 days of

1

when it was due. (Id.) Thatcher therefore asserted that she was entitled to retain Lang’s
payments after the 30-day grace period expired without notice to Lang. (Id., pp. 46-47.)
In his response, Lang argues that Thatcher’s reliance on Commercial Real Estate
Inv., L.C. v. Comcast of Utah II, Inc. is misplaced. (Cross-Aple. Br., p. 23). Lang states
that “the issue in this case is not whether the liquidated damages provision was
enforceable; it is whether Thatcher properly triggered that provision by complying with
the Agreement’s notice requirements.” (Id., p. 24.) Lang takes the position that, because
he does not challenge the enforceability of the liquidated damages provision, the Court
should reject application of Commercial Real Estate. (Id.) Lang also contends that he
cannot locate in the record where Thatcher raised in the trial court that Commercial Real
Estate defines the governing standard. (Id., p.24 n.10.) Lang therefore asserts that
Thatcher should be precluded from arguing the correct standard on appeal. (Id.) Citing
that standard would, according to Lang, allow Thatcher “to exploit her failure to raise the
issue below and impermissibly benefit from an error she invited.” (Id.)
After arguing against Thatcher’s reliance on Commercial Real Estate, the main
thrust of Lang’s argument against Thatcher’s ability to retain his payments as liquidated
damages is that Thatcher is ignoring the purported notice requirements under § 4.4 of the
Agreement in an “effort to justify her failure to comply” with those requirements.
(Cross-Aple. Br., p. 24.) Thatcher, in Lang’s view, incorrectly points to the liquidated
damages provision in the Option Agreement to argue that such language “survived,
applies, and saves her from her failure to comply with Section 4.4.” (Id.) Lang contends
that § 2 of the Agreement merged the Option Agreement with the Agreement and
2

“rendered ineffective any inconsistent or conflicting provision of the Option Agreement.”
(Id., p. 25.) Lang argues that the liquidated damages provisions in the two agreements
are conflicting and, as a result, “[t]he merger provision of the Agreement abrogates and
nullifies Section 11.” (Id., p. 27.)
A.

The liquidated damages provisions at issue are not subject to a
heightened standard of review, and should be enforced absent mistake,
fraud, duress, or unconscionability.

Lang’s contention that Thatcher’s reliance on Commercial Real Estate Inv., L.C. v.
Comcast of Utah II, Inc., 2012 UT 49, 285 P.3d 1193, is misplaced is without merit. As
an initial matter, Lang’s assertion that he cannot locate in the record where Thatcher
raised the holding in Commercial Real Estate as “creating a new standard that [the Court]
must apply” is incorrect. (Cross-Aple. Br., p. 24 n.10.) Thatcher is not arguing for the
application of a new standard. Rather, as she has consistently argued, the standard
applicable to liquidated damages provisions is that articulated in Commercial Real Estate.
(See, e.g., R.150-51, R.6326-27 (citing Commercial Real Estate).) Because she raised the
issue before the trial court, there are no issues regarding preservation/waiver, and there is
no need to engage in an analysis of invited error.1
Turning to the applicability of Commercial Real Estate, Lang argues that because
that case dealt with the enforceability of liquidated damages provisions generally, and not
notice requirements, it has no bearing. That is incorrect. Thatcher by way of her crossappeal seeks to overturn the trial court’s ruling regarding the enforceability of the
1

It is doubtful that application of the correct standard is substantive “argument” subject
to waiver in any event. The supreme court has consistently applied the correct legal
standards on appeal, limiting preservation issues to application of the standard.
3

liquidated damages provisions in the agreements. Neither provision required notice as
Thatcher has argued elsewhere. The provisions were self-executing. Thus, despite what
Lang contends, the issue on appeal is whether those provisions are enforceable, and not
whether Thatcher complied with any alleged notice obligations.
Under the standard in Commercial Real Estate, liquidated damages provisions
should be enforced:
[U]nless enforcement … would be unconscionable, we should recognize
and honor the right of persons to contract freely and to make real and
genuine mistakes when the dealings are at arms’ length. Courts ... should
not interfere except when sharp practice or most unconscionable result[s]
are to be prevented. Courts should invalidate liquidated damages clauses
only with great reluctance and when the facts clearly demonstrate that it
would be unconscionable to decree enforcement of the terms of the contract
… Liquidated damages clauses are not subject to any form of heightened
judicial scrutiny. Instead, courts should begin with the longstanding
presumption that liquidated damages clauses are enforceable. A party may
challenge the enforceability of a liquidated damages clause only by
pursuing one of the general contractual remedies, such as mistake, fraud,
duress, or unconscionability.
2012 UT 49, ¶ 40, 285 P.3d 1193.
Lang does not argue against the liquidated damages provisions’ enforceability on
the grounds of mistake, fraud, duress, or unconscionability. Instead, Lang rests his
argument upon two faulty premises.

First, he incorrectly states that the liquidated

damages provision in the Option Agreement had been invalidated by the Agreement’s
merger clause.

Second, he erroneously contends that the Agreement’s liquidated

damages provision required Thatcher to provide him with notice to trigger the provision.
As shown below, because the liquidated damages provisions in the two agreements are
not inconsistent or otherwise conflicting, both provisions remained in effect. Those
4

provisions were enforceable absent a mistake, fraud, duress, or to prevent an
unconscionable result.

Even if the liquidated damages provision in the Option

Agreement had been abrogated by the Agreement’s merger clause, the liquidated
damages provision in the Agreement did not require Thatcher to provide Lang with
notice to trigger the provision.
As noted above, because there are no notice requirements in either liquidated
damages provision, the issue here is the provisions’ enforceability and the applicable
standard. In short, if Lang’s contention that Thatcher was required to provide him with
notice to trigger the liquidated damages provision is wrong, then the provision should be
enforced. Lang has not argued any of the contractual defenses set forth above. His sole
argument is that Thatcher was required to provide him with notice. That argument fails
for the reasons set forth elsewhere herein.
In sum, the trial court erred in applying a heightened standard to Thatcher’s claim
for liquidated damages. The court should have enforced the provisions absent a valid
contractual defense. Lang, as noted, offered no such defense in the trial court, and argues
none here. Accordingly, the trial court’s unjust enrichment judgment should be reversed.
B.

Neither liquidated damages provision required notice.

Turning to the substantive question of Thatcher’s right to retain Lang’s payments
as liquidated damages, the main thrust of Lang’s argument is that the liquidated damages
provision in the Option Agreement was abrogated by the merger clause in the Agreement
because it is allegedly inconsistent or conflicts with the Agreement’s liquidated damages
provision. Putting aside for the moment that the liquidated damages provision in the
5

Agreement contains no notice requirement, Lang’s contention that the liquidated
damages provision in the Option Agreement was abrogated is incorrect.
Lang does not dispute that Section 11 of the Option Agreement entitled Thatcher
to automatically retain Lang’s prior payments as liquidated damages if he failed to make
any scheduled payment under the Option Agreement within 30 days after it was due.
Lang instead relies on Section 2 of the Agreement (the merger clause), which provides:
“The terms of the Option Agreement have been merged herein and to the extent any
terms or conditions of the Option Agreement conflict or are otherwise inconsistent with
this Agreement, the terms of the Agreement shall control,” to argue that Section 11 was
abrogated because it conflicted with § 4.4 of the Agreement. (R.6646, Ex. 8, § 2.)
The problem with Lang’s argument is that it presupposes a conflict between the
two agreements based upon Lang’s reading of § 4.4. According to Lang, because the
liquidated damages provision in the Agreement purportedly required Thatcher to provide
him with notice to trigger the provision, the Agreement controlled, and notice was
required. Lang’s view ignores the language of the liquidated damages provisions in both
agreements and, instead, attempts to conflate the notice requirements in the first sentence
of § 4.4 with Thatcher’s right to retain Lang’s payments as liquidated damages following
a 30-day grace period set forth in § 4.4’s second sentence.
Section 4.4 provided the options available to Thatcher upon Lang’s default. The
first sentence of § 4.4 states: “[Thatcher] may terminate this Agreement by giving written
notice to [Lang] if [Lang] materially breaches any covenant or other obligation of
[Buyer] under this Agreement and fails to cure such breach within thirty (30) days after
6

written notice from [Thatcher] is received by [Lang] specifying such breach.” (R. 9396;
Ex. 8, § 4.4.) The second sentence of § 4.4 states: “If [Lang] fails to make payment on or
before any deadline provided for herein after the expiration of thirty (30) day grace
period, all payment previously made shall be forfeited to [Thatcher] as liquidated
damages.” (Id.) Noticeably absent from the second sentence of § 4.4 is any requirement
of notice.
As explained in Thatcher’s opening brief, § 4.4 addresses two distinct concepts,
termination of the contract (requiring notice), and retention of payments made prior to
expiration of a grace period (not requiring notice). Lang cannot simply ignore that
distinction, and instead attempt to conflate the two provisions. Such a reading ignores the
intent of the parties as expressly confirmed in the Agreement and by Ms. Thatcher during
trial. (R.6869 ln. 10-17; R.7156-7158; R.7237-7238; R.7253 ln. 17-22.) Lang never
offered a differing interpretation. (Trial transcript, passim.)
As Utah courts have long recognized, there is nothing that prevents a forfeiture
provision from being self-executing. See, e.g., Papodopulos v. Defabrizio, 125 P.2d 416,
418 (Utah 1942); Fed. Land Bank of Berkeley v. Sorenson, 121 P.2d 398, 399-400 (Utah
1942); Leone v. Zuniga, 34 P.2d 699 (Utah 1934); Howorth v. Mills, 221 P. 165 (Utah
1923).

Nothing in the second sentence of § 4.4 required Thatcher to take “some

affirmative act … to notify [Lang] of what specific provision in the contract [she was]
proceeding under and … what [Lang] must [have done] to bring the contract current.”
Grow v. Marwick Development, Inc., 621 P.2d 1249, 1251-52 (Utah 1980). Rather, the
provision was self-executing; i.e., Thatcher was automatically entitled to retain Lang’s
7

payments as liquidated damages after a 30-day grace period without regard to the notice
requirements in the preceding sentence of § 4.4.
Lang’s argument attempts to improperly inject the notice requirements from the
first sentence of § 4.4 into the liquidated damages provision in the second sentence. That
argument contradicts the express wording of the liquidated damages provisions in both
agreements, which automatically entitled Thatcher to retain Lang’s prior payments
without notice to him. Because the liquidated damages provision in the Agreement
required no notice, it did nothing to abrogate the liquidated damages provision in the
Option Agreement via the Agreement’s merger clause.
II.

EVEN IF THATCHER WAS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE LANG WITH
NOTICE TO TRIGGER THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THATCHER
FAILED TO MEET HER OBLIGATION.2
Thatcher argued in her opening brief that, even if required to provide Lang with

notice to trigger the liquidated damages provision, the trial court erred in determining that
she did not meet her obligation. (Cross-Aplt. Br., pp. 47-50.) Thatcher contended that
her notice to Lang was sufficient, especially where Lang was previously aware of his
default and he had no doubt as to what Thatcher expected through her notice. (Id., pp.
48-50.) Because there was no uncertainty regarding Lang’s default, Thatcher asserted
that her notice to him was sufficient, and she was therefore entitled to retain Lang’s prior
payments as liquidated damages. (Id.)

2

The Court need not reach this issue if it finds that no notice was required to retain
payments.
8

Lang does not dispute that Thatcher provided him with notice. Instead, he argues
that Thatcher’s notice was insufficient because, as the trial court found, it failed to strictly
comply with the Agreement’s notice requirements. (Cross-Aple. Br., pp. 28-30.) Lang
states that whether he was aware of the nature of his default is irrelevant. (Id., p. 28.)
Even if relevant, Lang claims that the trial court never made a finding about what he did
or did not know, and Thatcher should be required to marshal the evidence to demonstrate
that the trial court’s ruling was in error. (Id.¸ pp. 28-29.)
A.

Lang’s admitted knowledge of his default is relevant in the context of
Thatcher’s notice of default.

In support of the contention that his knowledge of his default is irrelevant, Lang
relies on Commercial Inv. Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). (Lang
Br., p. 28.) In Siggard, Commercial Investment Corp. entered into a real estate purchase
contract with the Siggards for the sale of twenty acres of a thirty-eight acre parcel of
undeveloped land. Siggard, 936 P.2d at 1107. The contract provided for annual interest
payments on March 3rd of every year beginning in 1989 and ending in 1998 when the
entire unpaid principal became due. Id. Commercial Investment Corp. failed to make its
second interest payment owing on March 3, 1990. Id. On March 5, 1990, the Siggards
sent Commercial Investment Corp. a notice of default pursuant to the contract. Id.
Commercial Investment Corp. received the notice on March 6, 1990, triggering its 30-day
cure period under the contract.

On April 2, 1990, the Siggards sent Commercial

Investment Corp. a notice of forfeiture dated April 3, 1990. Id. Commercial Investment
Corp. received the notice of forfeiture on April 3rd, two days before the 30-day cure
9

period had elapsed. Id. at 1107-1108. On April 4, 1990, Commercial Investment Corp.
filed a Notice of Interest against the entire thirty-eight acre parcel. Two years later,
Commercial Investment Corp. sued the Siggards for specific performance. Id. at 1108.
The Siggards counterclaimed for breach of contract and wrongful lien.
At trial, the jury found, among other things, that the Siggards performed all steps
necessary to forfeit Commercial Investment Corp.’s interest in the contract. Id. On
Appeal, Commercial Investment Corp. challenged that finding. Id. This Court framed
the issue on appeal as follows: “Buyer argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support the jury's verdict that Sellers performed all the necessary steps to forfeit Buyer’s
interest in the property.” Id. As part of its analysis, the court focused on the premature
nature of the notice. Id. at 1109-10. The Siggards argued that “because Buyer clearly
understood its rights and knew it had thirty days to cure the default but failed to do so, the
premature notice was just a technicality that can be ignored.” Id. at 1109. Ultimately, the
court overturned the jury’s finding, rejecting “Seller’s contention that Buyer's
nonperformance in those last two days somehow legitimatized the premature notice.” Id.
at 1110.
The issue in Siggard was not whether a buyer’s prior knowledge of his default is
relevant to the notice issue. Rather, the issue was whether a premature notice was
sufficient under the contract at issue. In that case, the “Buyer’s knowledge of its default
and its failure to tender performance in those last two remaining days [did] not validate
Sellers’ otherwise defective forfeiture.” Id. at 1110. Lang contends that the foregoing
quoted language forecloses any argument that his prior knowledge of his default is
10

relevant to the notice issue, but Siggard addresses a different issue and its holding has no
bearing on Thatcher’s argument. Furthermore, Lang ignores the cases cited by Thatcher
setting forth the reasoning and application of notice requirements under Utah law.
Forfeitures are disfavored in Utah only “where the notice to the buyer of the impending
forfeiture is uncertain as to the performance demanded, or misleads the buyer into
thinking that the forfeiture provision will not be strictly enforced.” Madsen v. Anderson,
667 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983); see also¸ First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d
1078, 1081-82 (Utah 1983); Grow v. Marwick Development, Inc., 621 P.2d 1249, 1252
(Utah 1980).
The purpose of notice requirements in the context of a forfeiture is to prevent
uncertainty or to otherwise prevent a defaulting party from being misled. Thus, by its
very nature, the notice inquiry involves the knowledge of the defaulting party, and such
knowledge should be considered in analyzing the sufficiency of a notice of
default/forfeiture. Siggard is not determinative. Thatcher’s notice should have been read
in the context of the communications between Lang and Thatcher’s counsel. Those
communications show an undisputed awareness by Lang of his default. The trial court
erred by failing to analyze Thatcher’s notice in the context of Lang’s admissions.
Accordingly, the trial court’s unjust enrichment judgment should be reversed.
B.

The trial court made several findings regarding Lang’s prior
knowledge of his default.

Lang next asserts that the trial court never made a finding “about what Lang knew
or did not know.” (Lang Br., p. 28.) That is incorrect. The court made a number of
11

findings that Lang was previously aware of his default. (R.9395-96, ¶¶ 44 and 47,
R.9397, ¶ 52, R.9398, ¶¶ 56, 58-59, R.9401, ¶ 68, R.9402, ¶ 74, R.9407, ¶ 88 and n.5,
R.9412, ¶ 107.) The trial court’s findings were supported by the evidence at trial (See,
e.g., Exs. 107, 117, 122, 124, 195 & B-47), and Lang has not challenged them on appeal.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT’S UNJUST ENRICHMENT RULING SHOULD BE
REVERSED WHERE THE AGREEMENT COVERED THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE LITIGATION, AND THE COURT OTHERWISE
FOUND THAT LANG BREACHED THE AGREEMENT.
Thatcher argued in her opening brief that the trial court erroneously ruled that,

since it believed that Thatcher had not “strictly” met the conditions necessary to enforce
the forfeiture provision, the Agreement should be treated as lacking any such provision.
(Cross-Aplt. Br., pp. 51-53). Under Utah law, a claim for unjust enrichment is not
allowed in cases such as this where an enforceable contract exists that governs the
remedies available to an injured party. (Id., pp. 51-52). The Agreement addressed the
disposition of payments previously made by Lang in the event of his failure to make later
payments. (Id., p. 53.) Any remedy available to Lang for his failure to pay is controlled
by the Agreement. (Id.) The trial court was not entitled to read the liquidated damages
provision out of the Agreement entirely where the clause was self-executing and/or
Thatcher complied with any notice obligations. (Id.)
Thatcher further asserted that the trial court erroneously concluded that Lang’s
unjust enrichment claim could proceed despite the court’s finding that Lang breached the
Agreement. (Cross-Aplt. Br., pp. 53-55). A breaching party, such as Lang, should not be
afforded a premium where he fails to comply with contractual obligations. (Id., p. 53). If
12

breaching parties were awarded such a windfall, it would improperly allow those parties
to fulfill their obligations under a contract only when it suited them. (Id., p. 54.) If it did
not suit them, they could sue to recover the money they paid. (Id.) Even if such a result
were allowed, it is not allowed in cases such as this where the Agreement was
controlling, and Lang’s own inequitable conduct precludes restitution. (Id., p. 55.)
Lang contends in response that the trial court’s unjust enrichment determination
was correct, and that Thatcher has “failed to establish any error in the trial court’s
findings and reasoned analysis.” (Cross-Aple. Br., p. 30.) Lang initially notes that, if the
Court rules in his favor on his direct appeal, it moots the unjust enrichment award. (Id.)
If the Court affirms in that appeal, Lang urges that the Court should nevertheless uphold
the trial court’s unjust enrichment award. (Id.). Lang states that, “[i]f the Court turns
away Lang’s appeal, we have a situation not addressed in the Agreement: What happens
to the payments if the transaction never closes.” (Id., p. 31). Lang contends that, given
the foregoing, the trial court appropriately applied “the principles of equity since no
contractual provisions governed the remedies available to Lang,” and awarded Lang the
principal payments he had made under the contract. (Id., pp. 32-34).
Lang next asserts that, because the trial court dismissed Thatcher’s breach of
contract claim, she “cannot claim refuge in a failed cause of action” to argue against the
trial court’s unjust enrichment ruling. (Cross-Aple. Br., pp. 34-35.). Lang disputes
Thatcher’s contention that Lang “was the instigator of inequitable conduct.” (Id., p. 35.)
Lang says that such a contention contradicts the trial court’s findings. (Id.) Lang claims
that Thatcher does not sufficiently challenge the trial court’s findings, and therefore she
13

“cannot overcome the considerable discretion afforded the trial court and should result in
summary affirmance.” (Id., p. 36).
A.

Lang is unlikely to prevail on appeal.

As noted, Lang contends that, if the Court agrees with Lang on his direct appeal, it
moots the trial court’s unjust enrichment award. While this is self-evident, it ignores the
fact that trial court correctly found that he was not entitled to specific performance on the
grounds that Thatcher never repudiated the contract, and finding that:
Lang not only failed to tender the principal amount which he knew was
due, he failed to tender any interest payments that he knew were due until
the deadline for his performance in January 2013. His failure to tender
anything, under the circumstances of this case, precludes his recovery
against Thatcher.
(R.9417.)
Thatcher argued in her opening brief that the trial court found, regardless of any
claimed repudiation by Thatcher, Lang did not have the financial ability to perform.
(Cross-Aplt. Br., pp. 23-31.) Lang has not challenged this finding on appeal, conceding
his inability to perform under the contract. (Id.¸ p. 28.) Alternatively, Thatcher argued
for affirmance on two additional grounds. First, she argued the trial court’s judgment
may be affirmed where, “under the circumstances of this case,” the trial court determined
that Lang needed to tender performance to avail himself of specific performance. (Id., pp.
31-39.) Second, she argued that the judgment may also be affirmed where the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in weighing the equities. (Id., pp. 37-39.) Lang does not
challenge the trial court’s findings that support its decision, and therefore has conceded
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those findings. (Id., p. 38-39.) Considering the foregoing, Lang cannot succeed on his
direct appeal.
B.

Lang’s unjust enrichment claim is foreclosed by the existence of an
enforceable contract.

Lang contends that the trial court properly allowed his unjust enrichment claim to
go forward, despite the existence of the Agreement. Lang acknowledges that unjust
enrichment claims are disallowed where an enforceable contract covers the subject matter
of the litigation. (Id., p. 31.); see also, Helf v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81, ¶ 69,
361 P.3d 63; Selvig v. Blockbuster Enters., LC, 2011 UT 39, ¶ 30, 266 P.3d 691; Ashby v.
Ashby, 2010 UT 7, ¶ 14, 227 P.3d 246; TruGreen Cos., LLC, v. Mower Bros., Inc., 2008
UT 81, ¶ 18, 199 P.3d 929; Mann v. Am. W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978);
E&M Sales West, Inc. v. Diversified Metal Products, Inc., 2009 UT App 299, ¶ 8, 221
P.3d 838; Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Lang nonetheless
contends that the trial court appropriately applied an exception to the general rule.
Lang argues that, “even where there is an express contract, an equitable claim may
be viable, under specific factual circumstances, if the equitable claim is based on a
separate representation or misleading act arising independently of the express contract.”
(Cross-Aple. Br., p. 31 (quoting E & M Sales W., Inc., 2009 UT App 299, ¶ 8).) Thatcher
does not dispute that equity may step in where a “separate representation” is made, or a
“misleading act” is done, independent of the contract. However, that is not the case here.
Lang points to no finding by the trial court that would justify his claim for unjust
enrichment. Reliance on E.M. Sales W., Inc. is therefore misplaced. The fact remains
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that an enforceable contract existed between the parties, which forecloses Lang’s unjust
enrichment claim.
1.

The Agreement addresses the remedies available to Lang in the
event he failed to make timely payments.

Lang next contends that “the Agreement did not address what would happen to
payments if proper notice of default was not given” and, as a result, “it was appropriate
for the trial court to address this issue through principles of equity since no contractual
provisions governed the remedies available to Lang.” (Cross-Aple. Br., pp. 31-32.)
However, Lang’s argument continues to incorrectly presuppose that Thatcher was
required to provide Lang with notice to trigger the liquidated damages provision. As set
forth above, the liquidated damages provisions were self-executing and were triggered
upon Lang’s failure to make any scheduled payment within 30-days of when it was due.
Lang does not dispute that he did not make the February 2012 interest payment before the
expiration of the 30-day grace period (or any thereafter).
By the express terms of the agreements, Thatcher was automatically entitled to
keep Lang’s prior payments as liquidated damages. Any remedies available to Lang were
governed by the liquidated damages provisions. If Lang wished to avoid forfeiting his
prior payments, the agreements provided him with a 30-day grace period within which to
make his scheduled payment. Lang did not avail himself of the grace period, and
therefore gave up his right to his prior payments. The trial court erred in ruling to the
contrary.
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2.

The trial court erred by reading the liquidated damages
provision out of the Agreement where the provision was selfexecuting, or Thatcher otherwise complied with any notice
obligations.

Lang asserts that, despite Thatcher’s arguments to the contrary, “the trial court did
not ignore the existence of the Agreement,” rather, “[i]t confronted it.” (Cross-Aple. Br.,
p. 33.) As Thatcher points out above, while the court cited to the wording of the
Agreement in analyzing Lang’s unjust enrichment claim, it failed to recognize (as Lang
does on appeal) that the liquidated damages provisions in the agreements did not require
Thatcher to provide Lang with notice to trigger the provision. See pp. 7-10, supra. The
trial court therefore erred by determining that, “[s]ince the conditions necessary for the
enforcement of the forfeiture provision are not met here, the court concludes that the
Agreement should be treated as one lacking such a provision, and that the unjust
enrichment claim is viable.” (R.9419-20.)
Even assuming that Thatcher was required to provide Lang with notice, she met
her obligation. This is especially true where Lang was keenly aware of his default. He
has never claimed that he was uncertain about the nature of his default or that Thatcher
attempted to mislead him. Because Thatcher met her purported notice obligations, the
trial court erred by reading the forfeiture provision out of the Agreement. See pp. 10-14,
supra.
3.

The existence of a valid liquidated damages provision forecloses
Lang’s unjust enrichment claim.

Only after reading the liquidated damages provision out of the Agreement, Lang
says the trial court correctly concluded it could resort to equity to return Lang’s prior
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payments to him. (Cross-Aple. Br., pp. 33-34.) However, the sources cited by the trial
court in its decision (and by Lang in his response) recognize the general rule that “a
vendee in default cannot recover back the money he has paid on an executory contract to
his vendor who is not himself in default.” 4 A.L.R.4th 993, Part I § 2 (1981). As the
commentator noted, this is true even in cases where the contract at issue “did not involve
a provision specifically allowing the vendor to retain as forfeited the payments made by
the vendee prior to his breach.” Id. In those decisions, the courts have often explained
that the vendee was precluded from any recovery “even though the amount retained
exceeded the damages caused to the vendor by the default.” Id. Thus, the general rule is
that, even if a contract does not contain a valid forfeiture provision, a defaulting vendee is
not entitled to recover his prior payments under theory of unjust enrichment/restitution.
As a corollary, even in cases (such as this) involving “a contract containing a
forfeiture provision, the courts have been principally concerned with whether the
provision was an enforceable liquidated damages provision or an unenforceable penalty.”
Id. “Since this determination involves, in part, a consideration of the reasonableness of
the amount forfeited in relation to the damages actually or likely to be suffered, equitable
considerations necessarily come into play,” but only to the extent the liquidated damages
provision is determined to be an unenforceable penalty. Id. Neither the trial court, nor
Lang, has pointed to any Utah case law refuting the general rule set forth above, which is
consistent with the ordinary principles of contract interpretation governing liquidated
damages provisions in Utah. See Commercial Real Estate, supra.
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The trial court did not find (and Lang does not argue on appeal) that enforcing the
liquidated damages provision as written would amount to an unenforceable penalty.
Rather, the trial court’s ruling rested on its application of the elements of unjust
enrichment: “[T]he evidence shows that Lang has conferred a net benefit upon Thatcher,
and that the circumstances are such as to make it unjust for her to retain the amount paid
toward the purchase price, $800,000.”

(R.9421.)

However, given that an unjust

enrichment claim cannot be sustained where an enforceable contract exists, the trial
court’s determination was in error and should be reversed.
C.

Lang cannot make a claim for unjust enrichment where he himself
breached the Agreement.

Lang disputes that the trial court found that he breached the Agreement,
contending that “[t]he trial court expressly dismissed Thatcher’s claim for breach.”
(Cross-Aple. Br., pp. 33-34.) According to Lang, the point of the trial court’s unjust
enrichment ruling is that, because Thatcher never validly put Lang in default, it was
unjust for her to retain Lang’s payments as liquidated damages. Lang’s assertions are
incorrect for two reasons.
As set forth above, the trial court erroneously determined that the Agreement
required Thatcher to provide Lang with notice before she could retain his principal
payments as liquidated damages. It was upon that faulty conclusion that the trial court
dismissed Thatcher’s first cause of action for breach of contract.

(R.9421-22.)

Moreover, although the court dismissed Thatcher’s first cause of action for breach of
contract, it granted her quiet title claim on the grounds that “Lang is not entitled to an
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award of specific performance due to his unexcused failure to tender his own
performance at any time prior to the January 10, 2013 deadline.” (R.9422-23.) Given
that failure, the trial court concluded that Lang “lack[ed] any enforceable right to Parcel
A under the Agreement.” (R.9423.) The trial court also found that Lang engaged in
other inequitable conduct, including threatening to sue Thatcher, refusing to respond to
Thatcher’s attempts to obtain compliance, making misrepresentations about his ability to
close, and engaging in other conduct the trial court found to be unreasonable. (R.9405,
¶¶ 80-81, R.9409-10, ¶96, R.9411, ¶ 102, R.9412-13, ¶¶ 107-108.) In light of these
unchallenged findings, Lang cannot argue that he did not engage in inequitable conduct,
or that Thatcher’s arguments “aimed at claiming Lang was the instigator of inequitable
conduct contradict the trial court’s findings that allowing Thatcher to retain all payments
would be inequitable.” (Cross-Aple. Br., p. 35.)
Lang also fails to recognize that his own inequitable conduct precludes his unjust
enrichment claim. As part of its decision, the trial court relied in part on the Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.

(R.9420.)

As the court stated: “A

performing party whose material breach prevents a recovery on the contract has a claim
in restitution against the recipient of performance, as necessary to prevent unjust
enrichment.” (Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §
36(1)).) Lang’s response cites the foregoing language to support his argument that the
trial court was within its discretion to return his principal payments to him even if he
breached the Agreement.
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The trial court’s decision and Lang’s response both ignore other pertinent portions
of the Restatement. Under § 36(3), “[a] claim under this section may be displaced by a
valid agreement of the parties establishing the rights and remedies in the event of
default.” (Cross-Aplt. Br. p., 55 (citing Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment § 36(2)).) As argued above, the Agreement between the parties covers the
subject matter of this litigation—namely what happened to Lang’s prior payments in the
event he failed to make a later payment. The trial court erred by failing to address §
36(3).
The trial court’s decision and Lang’s response also fail to address § 36(4) and cmt.
b thereto, which provide that “[i]f the claimant’s default involves fraud or other
inequitable conduct, restitution may on that account be denied.” (Id. (citing Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 36(4) and cmt. b).) Given the court’s
findings that Lang engaged in inequitable conduct, the trial court erred by failing to
address § 36(4) and cmt. b. Lang does not discuss these provisions in his response, or
otherwise address the trial court’s failure to analyze the provisions as part of its decision.
Finally, Lang takes issue with Thatcher’s reliance on the Utah Supreme Court’s
holding in Foxley v. Rich, 99 P. 666 (Utah 1909), as well as a host of other similar rulings
from other jurisdictions across the country.

Lang contends that Thatcher fails to

acknowledge that the reasoning in Foxley was dependent solely upon the facts of that
case, urging that, because the facts do not demonstrate that Thatcher was willing to
convey title to Lang, Foxley has no applicability. (Lang Br., pp. 35-36.) That is simply
not true and is belied by the trial court’s findings.
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As Thatcher argued in her opening brief, the trial court rejected Lang’s arguments
regarding repudiation. (Cross-Aplt. Br., pp. 23-24.) Lang points to no other findings by
the trial court to support his contention that Thatcher was unwilling to convey title of the
property to him. To the contrary, Thatcher continued working with Lang up and until the
closing date set forth in the Agreement. (R.9408-9409, ¶¶ 90-95.) Given her continued
efforts to close on the sale of the property, Lang’s contrary assertion is without merit.
Thatcher stood willing and able to perform, and it was Lang (not Thatcher) who was
unable to close on the property by the date indicated in the Agreement.
As the supreme court explained in Foxley, “To permit [Lang] to recover back his
payments under the facts and circumstances of this case would, in effect, offer a premium
to [Lang as a] purchaser[ ] of real estate to refuse to comply with [the Agreement].”
Foxley, 99 P. at 672. If Lang was permitted to recover his principal payments, then it
would promote inequitable conduct by purchasers of real estate, who could, “[i]f the
bargain suited them, … insist on the completion of the purchase; but if it did not, they
[could] refuse to complete it, and sue to recover back the money paid by them.” Id.
Certainly, Utah law would not stand for such a result. Foxley remains good law, and its
policy of not rewarding defaulting parties remains a recognized principal in the law
across the country.

For those reasons, its holding applies, and Lang’s attempt to

distinguish it should be ignored.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment should be reversed on Lang’s unjust
enrichment claim.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2018.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee/CrossAppellant
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